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EXTERNALITIES AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR
CYCLICAL SOCIAL PREFERENCES
PETER BERNHOLZ
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Arrow put forward his General Impossibility Theorem,
it has been well-known that no consistent Social Welfare Function
can exist in a non-oligarchic society if certain reasonable conditions
are fulfilled [Arrow, 1963]. It has been shown, moreover, by Sen [1970]
that a dilemma exists for "Minimal Liberalism" in the sense that it
leads to a contradiction with Pareto optimality. These results dem-
onstrate that several inconsistencies and dilemmas are connected with
different decentralized organizational forms of society.
Another part of the literature is concerned with market failures.
Here it has been shown that a market organization of the economy
can, even under a regime of perfect competition, lead to non-Pareto
optimal outcomes, if externalities are present [Mishan, 1971]. Again
it appears obvious that there exists some relationship between this
result and the type of organization of society. But this time not only
the kind of organization, but also the presence of externalities is
necessary for the result. One wonders, therefore, whether there might
exist a relationship between the results of the two fields of economic
literature. To put it differently, is there no general relationship be-
tween externalities, the kinds of decentralized organizations of society,
and the dilemmas, contradictions, or inconsistencies mentioned?
That such a general relationship may exist is also suggested by
other work. More than fifteen years ago, Buchanan [1962] and Bu-
chanan and Tullock [1965, pp. 60-62] stressed the fact that collective
decision-making not requiring unanimity may lead to negative ex-
ternalities. If, let us say, a simple majority outvotes a minority on a
substantive issue, then the execution of the decision taken will lead
to a worse position for the members of the minority. Here we may
speak of externalities of collective decision-making, which are again
clearly related to the organization of society and to the kind of decision
rule used, even if these externalities appear to be different from those
considered in the market-failure literature.
It is the purpose of the present paper to explore more closely the
relationship between externalities and the possible shortcomings,
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dilemmas, and inconsistencies of decentralized organizational
systems.
In Section II we shall introduce a notation that can be used for
very different kinds of decentralized societies. Besides, a rather broad
definition of externalities will be proposed covering both the tradi-
tional and the Buchanan-Tullock types. In Section III, we shall give
a proof that externalities are a necessary condition for the existence
of cyclical social preferences. This result may in a sense not appear
to be too impressive, taking into account the broad definition of ex-
ternalities to be used. But the relationship has never been stated be-
fore. In Section IV we shall discuss the meaning of the result and of
the definition of externalities proposed.
II. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Let us consider a set U of n > 2 outcomes and a set V of m .?_ 2
individuals forming a kind of group or a society. Assume that the right
to decide among any pair of outcomes xi, xi eU has been allocated to
a subset Vij g. V of society, with i  j; ii = 1,2, . . . , n and Vii  (I).
Assume further that all individuals of society have complete,
weak, and transitive preferences. All Vij decide among xi and xi fol-
lowing given nonstochastic decision rules such that there exists at least
one winning coalition Cif g V, CI;  4), which can decide for society
in favor of xi as against xi if all of its members prefer the former to
the latter, xiPhxi for all h e Cu , whatever be the preferences of all
individuals belonging to V — Vii and given those of the people be-
longing to Vii — Cif. Moreover, if Cif is a winning coalition, then Cif
U WI c Vi; is a winning coalition too, if x iPgxj and if the preferences
of all other members of Vi; are unchanged.
It is important to realize that the above assumptions allow all
kinds of non-oligarchic decentralized institutional arrangements of
society, including "pure liberalism" at one extreme, where different
individuals have the right to decide among different pairs of all out-
comes, and "total direct democracy" at another extreme, where all
members of society together have the right to make all the decisions
by using simple majority voting.
Next, let us define "social preference relations." We shall say that
"society prefers xi to xj,"xiPxj, if there exists at least one winning
coalition Cif for all of whose members h e Cu xiPhx; holds. Further,
xiRxj, "society prefers xi to xi or is indifferent between them," if there
is no winning coalition whose members prefer x; to x i ; i.e., if xiPx i does
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not hold. If neither xiPxj nor xiPxi is valid; i.e., if neither a minimal
winning coalition for xi against xi nor for xi against xi exists, "society
is indifferent" between xi and xj, xi/x3.
We now turn to define externalities. Assume that some winning
coalition Cu exists for whose members
x iPhxj,
	
so that xiPxi
is valid. Thus, Cu can bring about xi, whenever xi is present. But this
would lead to externalities for people not belonging to the coalition
f either
XiPh Xj
or (and)
xiPhxi
	
for some he V — Cii•
In the former case positive and in the latter case negative externalities
would be present for some he V — Cii if Cii brought about x i starting
from xj. Thus, the following definition will be used: externalities are
absent if for any outcomes xi, xi e U, and some Cu, with xiPhxj for all
he Cif, xiIhxj holds for all he V — Cii. We shall discuss this rather
broad definition in Section IV.
III. PROOF OF THE THEOREM
We are now able to state and prove Theorem 1.
THEOREM I. Externalities are a necessary condition for the existence
of cyclical social preferences.
The proof of the theorem is simple. We assume the existence of
cyclical group preferences and the absence of externalities and show
that this leads to a contradiction.
Consider outcomes xo,x 1, • . . , xs and assume that
(1) xsPxs_ iP . . . Px iPxoPxs ,	 3 . s 5. n
holds, such that cyclical social preferences exist. Then there must be
winning coalitions Cs,s-1,Cs-i,s-2, • • • , Cio,Cos for whom
(2) xoPhx,	 for all hE COs
or (and)
(3)
	
xiPhxi- i 	for all he CiA-1 	(i = 1,2, . . . , s)
is valid.
(5) xo/hxs
and
(6) xi/hxi-1
for all he V - Cos
for all he V - Cii--1,
	
(i = 1,2, . . . , s).
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It is important to realize that (1) implies
s)(4)	 ( r ci,i_i)ncos = 4),
i = 1
for if any individual were in all those sets, that individual's preferences
would have to be cyclical, i.e. intransitive, contrary to the hypothesis.
Note that (4) implies the absence of any oligarchy.
We resume our proof by assuming that no externalities exist for
any member of society not belonging to Cos
 or to the Ci,i-i (i = 1,2,
. . . , s). Then it follows from the definition of the absence of exter-
nalities and from (1) that
From (2) and (5) and from (3) and (6) we derive, respectively,
(7) xoRhx,	 for all he V
and
(8) XiRhXi- 1
	 for all he V and all i = 1,2, . . . , s.
Now consider some Ci,i_ 1 (i = 1,2, . . . , s) or Cos for all of whose
members (3) or (2) is valid. Obviously Cos ,Ci,i-i c V, so that (7) or (8)
is true for all he Cij_ i or he Co,. But then one can derive from (2) and
(8) or from (3), (7), and (8), respectively,
(9) x,Rhxs_iRh . . . Rhx 1Rhx0Phx s 	for all he Cos, ,
Or
(10) xsRhxs-iiih • • • RhxiPhxi-iRh • • • RhxoRhxs,
for all he Ci,i-1(i = 1,2, . . . , s).
This result, however, contradicts the assumption of transitive
individual preferences. Thus, cyclical social preferences cannot exist
if no externalities are present. Q.E.D.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND OF THE
DEFINITION OF EXTERNALITIES
Theorem 1 states a remarkable result, even if it depends on a
rather broad definition of externalities. Nevertheless, it is not true
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that the presence of externalities is sufficient to lead to cyclical social
preferences. First, the presence of non-oligarchic, somewhat decen-
tralized, forms of society is necessary to bring about the theorem.
Second, even with such an organization, externalities are not a suffi-
cient condition for the existence of cyclical social preferences. It is easy
to construct examples in which externalities do not lead to cycles in
decentralized organizations of society [Bernholz, 1980]. Third, it can
easily be shown that given some preferences of all members of society,
there can be different forms of decentralized organizations, some with
cyclical social preferences, others without them.
It should be understood that externalities are not only a necessary
condition for Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem, but also for
other impossibility or dilemma results. As has been shown, e.g., in a
recent paper [Bernholz, 1980], Sen's dilemma of a Paretian Liberal
is true for all the non-oligarchic decentralized organizations consid-
ered here, if enough outcomes are present, and implies cyclical social
preferences.
Thus, it follows that the "contradiction between minimal de-
centralization (including minimal liberalism) and Pareto optimality"
also depends on the presence of externalities.
Let us now turn to the definition of externalities. It is true that
the absence of externalities in the sense of the broad definition used
requires that all members of society outside the winning coalition be
indifferent as to the pair of outcomes in question. This may appear
to be a stricter requirement than can ever be satisfied in real life, but
in fact it is frequently met. In Sen's example, Mr. A (presumably a
bachelor) prefers sleeping on his back to sleeping on his stomach, and
it is reasonable to assume that every other person in society is indif-
ferent. Clearly, such instances abound. But one has to realize that if
this condition is not fulfilled, then there are people in society who will
either be hurt or will benefit by a decision taken by the respective
winning coalition according to their own judgments. Their positions
are changed either because they are not members of the decision-
making subset, or because they, as members of this subset, are "out-
voted," so that externalities in the sense of Buchanan [1962] and
Buchanan and Tullock [1965] are present.
We have stressed that our criterion for the presence of exter-
nalities has been the judgments of the people concerned. We have
done so because the same criterion is used when applying the Pareto
principle. Thus, whereas the definition of externalities used may be
rather broad, a narrower one would imply the abandonment of the
Pareto principle, which is widely used in Welfare Economics and is
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necessary to establish the above-mentioned theorems, proved by
Arrow and Sen. For this principle, too, requires the judgment of ev-
erybody, whether he himself prefers some outcomes to others or
not.
An extensive discussion of the merits of different concepts of
externalities must wait for another, more philosophical, paper. Here,
let me first compare our definition to a more traditional one, namely
that a (negative) externality exists, whenever there is an individual
h such that xiPhxi and a winning coalition exists for each of whose
members k, xiPkxj holds. It is obvious that our definition includes
the latter one. The definition used is, however, broader in the sense
that it also takes into account positive externalities. Moreover, we
have preferred to define not the presence but the absence of exter-
nalities.
Next I would like to mention two different possibilities to define
externalities and the difficulties related to them. One of them would
be a definition including only the cases in which "the surroundings"
of an individual including himself are phsyically changed by the de-
cisions of others. There are several difficulties with this definition.
What are "the surroundings" of an individual? When are. they
"physically changed"? And should we include in the definition
changes in which the respective member of society does not perceive
the physical changes or considers them to be irrelevant to his well-
being?
A second possibility would be to include the individual percep-
tions of a wanted or unwanted physical change. But this would not
remove the other two difficulties. Are the physical surroundings
changed if the individual in question has to endure the sight of
somebody in red trousers, which he hates? Certainly the light-waves
perceived have been changed when the other person moved into his
sight. But is this to be considered a physical change?
This discussion shows that it is not easy to give up the broad
definition used in this paper. The result may thus be helpful to con-
centrate attention on two questions: (1) what kinds of externalities
should be taken into account in which decentralized societies; and (2)
which allocations of decision rights to which subsets of society together
with which decision rules would be most adequate, given different
profiles of preferences of the members of society?
V. SUMMARY
Cyclical social preferences in decentralized non-oligarchic so-
cieties are a consequence of the existence of three or more different
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winning coalitions with no member of society in common. I have
shown that externalities are a necessary condition for the presence
of cyclical social preferences and are, therefore, the reason for the
validity of the General Impossibility Theorem, the Paradox of
Liberalism (more generally, of decentralized systems) and of Pareto
inferior solutions. A short discussion of the definition of externalities
concludes the paper.
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